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RISK PROPENSITY IN THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LOCATION DECISION 
OF EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 
 
Abstract: A distinguishing feature of emerging economy multinationals is their apparent tolerance for 
host country institutional risk. Employing behavioral decision theory and quasi-experimental data, we 
find that managers’ domestic experience satisfaction increases their relative risk propensity regarding 
controllable risk (legally protectable loss), but decreases their tendency to accept non-controllable risk 
(e.g., political instability). In contrast, firms’ potential slack reduces relative risk propensity regarding 
controllable risk, yet amplifies the tendency to take non-controllable risk. We suggest that these 
counterbalancing effects might help explain prior ambiguous findings on the relationship between 
experience, slack, and FDI decisions. The study provides a new understanding of why firms exhibit 
heterogeneous responses to host country risks, and the varying effects of institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International business (IB) research has established that multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend 
to refrain from investing in countries with significant international risk – particularly institutional risk 
(Delios & Henisz, 2000; Delios & Henisz, 2003). Yet foreign direct investment (FDI), especially by 
emerging multinationals (EMNEs), into risky countries has been growing ever more rapidly. Many 
postulate that EMNEs can overcome institutional risk in foreign entries due to enhanced 
organizational capabilities derived from experiential learning (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Others 
contend that capital market imperfections in the home country confer on EMNEs excess funds that 
enable venturing in risky countries (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007a). Rarely is it 
noted that the claimed capabilities and borrowing capacity are not directly observed, but used as a 
theoretical mechanism to account for firms’ FDI risk-taking. In fact, we know little about how risky 
investments actually emerge.  
Firm-level causality is inevitably open to many alternative explanations; inferring the 
capabilities explanation from observed risk-taking seems tautological. A compelling argument – yet to 
be fully incorporated in the existing studies – is that it is managers who ultimately make the location 
decisions. Recent behavioral research suggests managers’ risk attitude and risk assessment model 
evolve with decision experience (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007b; Maitland & Sammartino, 
2015a, 2015b). Managers’ views on the applicability of previous experience in the focal context also 
play an important role in firms’ decision making (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Williams & 
Grégoire, 2015). It is increasingly conceivable that observed FDI risk-taking may be more the 
outcome of managerial cognition and responses than firm-level capabilities (Buckley & Strange, 
2011).  
To accommodate this view, we draw on the concept of risk propensity from behavioral 
decision research (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Risk propensity refers to an 
individual’s current tendency to assume a specific risk, which is affected by past experience outcomes 
and present conditions in the organizational context (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989). By implication, 
EMNEs’ unconventional inclination for institutional risks may simply reflect how managers make 
location decisions given the home country imprint (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007) and access to external 
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finance (Buckley et al., 2007a). However, one could also argue that EMNEs’ attraction to 
underdeveloped institutions is not because of a less aversion to risk, but a greater capability or 
ambition for generating return in such environments. We therefore extend the conventional 
conceptualization of risk propensity to account for risk-return tradeoffs in the decision process. In this 
paper, we depict an ex ante account of FDI risk-taking using quasi-experimentation on a group of 
Chinese top managers. Operationalizing relative risk propensity as one’s marginal utility of risk over 
that of investment return, we examine how firm experience and present conditions – in particular, 
domestic experience satisfaction and the firm’s potential slack – cause heterogeneity of managers’ 
responses to risk in FDI location decisions. We find that the effect of these contextual variables differs 
depending on whether the risk in question is controllable or non-controllable. 
Our study contributes to the literature on two fronts. First, we open the black box of FDI risk-
taking, especially for EMNEs. Extant research rationalizes risky location choices using data on actual 
investments, forming the basis for the received wisdom of EMNEs’ global strategy and home-country-
based advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Yet this approach relies mostly on inference at the 
aggregate level, and suffers from the lack of microfoundations as to what actually drives risky 
decisions (Barney & Felin, 2013; Buckley, Chen, Clegg, & Voss, 2016). Our study offers a more 
informed understanding by attributing observed firm-level heterogeneity to varied managerial 
appetites for risk. We show that satisfaction with home country venturing may attenuate managers’ 
general tendency to avoid one type of institutional risk but accentuate another. Analyzing risk 
propensity also allows us to test directly how firms’ potential slack affects ex ante risk-taking (cf. 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). The fact that risk propensity accounts for the relations between firm-
level antecedents and FDI risk-taking demonstrates the necessity in articulating the lower level, 
behavioral mechanisms for understanding firms’ heterogeneous global strategies. Moreover, 
investment data reveals little information about the expected return, which weighs heavily in the 
location decision process (Buckley et al., 2007b). To offer a more realistic account, our approach 
examines risk propensity in relative terms, i.e. how much expected investment return one is willing to 
give up to avoid additional risks. We demonstrate that experimentation offers a unique means to 
capture this intuitive formalization of risk propensity, which complements ex post organizational risk 
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measures (Belderbos, Tong, & Wu, 2014) and subjective risk perception (Giambona, Graham, & 
Harvey, 2017). 
Second, our study yields new insights into the varying behavioral implications of controllable 
vs. non-controllable institutional risks. Extant research on how experience and context shape risk 
propensity employs competing theories and reports mixed findings. It casts doubt on the applicability 
of individual-level theories in the organizational context. We argue that different behavioral theories 
are developed in different task settings so that some, e.g. prospect theory, may be more applicable 
when external threat is involved and odds are exogenously given (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, 
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011), whilst others are best suited to circumstances where managers perceive 
a sense of control over the risk in question (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006). Our 
findings indeed suggest that managers respond to controllable and non-controllable risks differently. 
Differentiating the nature of the risk helps reconcile the equivocal effects of firm experience on FDI 
decisions (Oh & Oetzel, 2017), and clarify the facilitating role of potential slack in risk-taking (Singh, 
1986).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The capabilities explanation on FDI risk-taking 
Organizational learning theory proposes that experience is the primary source for acquiring 
new knowledge and the key path through which capabilities can be developed (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
Direct experience confers on organizational members the knowledge of action-outcome relationships 
and of the environmental impact on these relationships. In the IB literature, it is posited that 
international experience facilitates the acquisition of tacit knowledge about foreign markets and the 
process of cross-border operations, thereby reducing the perceived risk of further expansions (Delios 
& Henisz, 2000). This argument provides the theoretical reasoning underlying the relationship 
between experience and FDI risk-taking. Recent research has focused particularly on the institutional 
environment, as firms’ ability to grapple with weak institutions is considered an important ownership 
advantage for success in risky host countries (Buckley et al., 2007a; Henisz, 2003). Since the 
relevance of past experiences increases learning effectiveness, such non-market capabilities are 
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assumed to be fungible across countries with similar institutional conditions (Perkins, 2014). 
Following this logic, EMNEs’ expansion into risky countries is commonly attributed to political 
capabilities nurtured in the home country where firms have learned to cope with underdeveloped 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Empirical research reveals that 
FDI from countries with high corruption levels is evidently clustered in other corrupt countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), while firms from countries with organized crime problems proactively seek 
business opportunities in other countries with persistent organized crime (Ramos & Ashby, 2013). 
Despite the numerous insights generated, this literature does not directly examine what is 
learned from experience but rather attributes the relationship between experience and subsequent firm 
behavior to unobserved capabilities. Yet the inherited knowledge and home country imprint cannot 
always transfer to seemingly similar markets (Giarratana & Torrisi, 2010). Experience of engaging 
with local stakeholders does not automatically breed expertise in political hazard assessment (Maitland 
& Sammartino, 2015a) and in managing conflict risks (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). It implies that experience 
alone is not sufficient for learning (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). Microfoundations research 
suggests that experienced firms accumulate a set of “simple rule” heuristics, including where to locate 
value adding activities, as managers become cognitively more sophisticated over time (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2011). New insights into experiential learning emerge when researchers delve into the 
decision process through which managers evaluate environments and select among alternative 
opportunities (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). However, the predominance of the capabilities 
explanation leaves the puzzle unsettled as to what determines firms’ heterogeneous risk-taking in FDI. 
 
Managerial perspective and (relative) risk propensity 
An alternative approach to the firm level theorization casts spotlight on the managers who 
make the strategic decisions as to where to locate foreign subsidiaries (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). 
The premise is that observed risk-taking may not be driven by firm capabilities, but instead is a 
function of managerial risk propensity. Behavioral decision theory suggests that managerial risk-
taking is primarily affected by the firm’s past performance and present conditions (Bateman & 
Zeithaml, 1989). Attainment discrepancy and outcome history represent notable constructs accounting 
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for the impact of performance feedback and framing on subsequent risk-taking (Osborn & Jackson, 
1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Excess funds and slack resource are among 
the present firm conditions that affect managers’ risk-taking outlook (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986; 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). These contextual influences prompt behaviorists to ascribe apparent 
risk-taking to managers’ risk propensity – i.e. the likelihood of taking a specific risk (George et al., 
2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). It denotes the current, variable tendency, as 
opposed to a constant, dispositional risk preference. One could thus explain the relationship between 
experience and firm risk-taking by reference to managerial risk propensity; prior experience provides 
important feedback to managers about their ability to enact the environment in their own favor 
(Haleblian et al., 2006; March & Shapira, 1987) and the effectiveness of the coping strategies they 
have employed in controlling the risks (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Positive experience further 
enhances managers’ self-confidence in tackling similar risky tasks in the future (Zollo, 2009). 
However, two important issues remain underexplored that inhibit the development of the 
managerial perspective. First, the conceptualization and operationalization of risk propensity remains 
ambiguous. What kind of decisions are, ex ante, risk-laden or risk-reducing for the firm is unsettled in 
theory (Holmes et al., 2011). Strategic changes such as R&D investments are often presumed to 
indicate risk-taking, without an account of their potential value (Bromiley, Rau, & Zhang, 2016). By 
extension, one might contend that EMNEs’ greater appetite for host country risks observed by prior 
research is due to their stronger capability to extract rents in environments similar to their home 
country or due to higher ambitions for growth, rather than less aversion to risk. To examine truly how 
sensitive managers are to certain risks and what affects managerial risk propensity, it may be 
necessary to consider risk and return simultaneously (Witte et al., 2017). Following the risk-return 
framework, we maintain that managers make decisions based on a tradeoff between expected value 
and uncertain outcomes which maximizes utilities (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Whether a person is 
deemed more or less risk averse is not determined by the absolute risk level, but must take into 
account both her marginal utility of money and attitude toward uncertain outcomes (Jia, Dyer, & 
Butler, 1999). Therefore, we propose the construct of relative risk propensity, defined as the extent to 
which managers will sacrifice expected return to avoid taking on additional risks. This 
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conceptualization is consistent with the financial theory of investment (Jia et al., 1999), and can 
accommodate the effect of contextual influences such as outcome history and outcome framing 
(Weber & Milliman, 1997). Meanwhile, it provides a more intuitive and relevant formalization of the 
choice process.  
Second, applying the behavioral decision theory to organizational contexts has led to 
competing hypotheses and equivocal findings (Holmes et al., 2011). Research suggests that experience 
could prompt internationalization as managers overestimate the efficacy of prior strategies and fall 
prey to a competency trap (O'Grady & Lane, 1996), as well as inhibit internationalization when 
managers lack faith in the applicability of previous knowledge and capabilities in dealing with the 
anticipated environmental hazards (Duanmu, 2012). Similarly, behavioral studies document mixed 
effects of slack on risk-taking, not least in the context of internationalization (Rhee & Cheng, 2002). 
The slack-as-resource argument is proposed when researchers find that slack facilitates risk-taking 
behavior (Singh, 1986), whereas the “hunger-driven” view posits that low slack triggers problemistic 
search and risk-taking (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). We argue that conflicts exist partly because 
different theories are predicated on the different nature of the risks that trigger varying cognitive 
responses. Prospect theory suggests that poor performance may induce decision-makers to bet on the 
upside potential and make risky choices (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Weber & Milliman, 1997), 
whilst the “house money” thesis proposes that excess funds are treated as someone else’s money with 
which to take risks (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Both are developed in a context where odds are 
externally determined. Conversely, Slattery and Ganster (2002) find that, in decision tasks featuring 
uncertain outcomes, poor performance induces decision-makers to set less risky goals in subsequent 
decisions, as opposed to increased risk taking predicted by prospect theory. One implication is that the 
varying effects may depend on how managers view risk in the new investment context. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Given the complexity of FDI, IB literature not only recognizes the magnitude of international 
risk but also specifies its varieties. For instance, Miller (1992) proposes a comprehensive 
consideration of international risk, including general environment, industry and firm specific aspects. 
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To align with previous research, our hypotheses focus specifically on institutional risks. As argued 
earlier, different behavioral theories presume different nature of the risks, i.e. whether odds are 
externally determined, which leads to competing hypotheses. By extension, we break institutional 
risks into controllable and non-controllable ones. Managers often believe that riskiness of a choice in 
managerial situations can be controlled by their skills, talents and capabilities (March & Shapira, 
1987). Hence controllable risk is risk of which the probability and impact can be decreased by 
managerial actions. Non-controllable risk, however, can hardly be manipulated by the firms or 
managers, and is predominantly resolved by the passage of time (Cuypers & Martin, 2009). 
Figure 1 illustrates our framework. The horizontal arrow represents the general relationship 
between host country institutional risks and firms’ location choice (e.g., Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 
2008). Below this arrow lies our microfoundational explanation for this relationship, based on the 
latent construct of relative risk propensity (interchangeable with risk propensity hereafter, unless noted 
otherwise). The hypotheses will examine how firm-level contextual variables influence FDI risk-
taking by shaping relative risk propensity, i.e. managers’ true attitude towards risk after return is 
accounted for.. 
***Insert Figure 1 here*** 
 
Domestic experience satisfaction 
Entering unfamiliar territory carries risks for MNEs due to informational disadvantages 
relative to local counterparts (Zaheer, 1995). The same argument holds for domestic venturing. 
Subnational regions across a country feature cultural and social diversity (O'Grady & Lane, 1996). 
Establishing new operations in geographically distant markets at home offers managers direct learning 
opportunities regarding what cues are extracted from an unfamiliar environment and how to interpret 
them (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 2007). Investing in other subnational regions 
introduces more productive capacity to the local production base or takes up market share from 
incumbents, making it imperative to accommodate various interest groups. Such experience shapes 
managers’ domestic mindsets about resource exploitation (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). Satisfying 
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performance in inter-regional venturing fosters managers’ positive attitude toward foreign expansion 
(Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson, & Welch, 1978).  
Despite the “home country learning” argument being intuitive, domestic experience alone may 
not necessarily lead to FDI risk-taking. The gap in task features between domestic and international 
venturing could be wide enough to prevent managers from generalizing the efficacy of their 
capabilities gained from the former to the latter context (Gavetti et al., 2005). Moreover, the stock of 
home country experience per se is not enough to induce risk-taking (Haleblian et al., 2006). 
Behavioral decision theory posits that only positive outcome history increases managers’ risk 
propensity (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). For strategic decisions that produce 
fuzzy performance feedback, the history of decision quality may not derive from objective 
performance indicators (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). It is instead based on managers’ own 
interpretation of previous outcomes (Zollo, 2009). The extent to which managers are satisfied with 
prior experience shapes the constructed “reality” about their coping abilities. 
These concerns point to more intricacies regarding the transferability of home country 
experience; self-assessed potency seems to play an important role. We therefore argue that the 
relationship between satisfaction with domestic venturing and managerial risk propensity in foreign 
location choice may be contingent upon the nature of the types of international risk being discussed. 
The experience of dealing with controllable institutional risk like contractual hazard and opportunistic 
appropriation is one of capability cues. Managers’ cognitive resources and sophistication are 
conditioned by the institutional context in which the firm operates (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Satisfying 
domestic experience provides feedback on managers’ ability to control institutional risks, and positive 
self-evaluation boosts their confidence in coping with institutional constraints through remedial 
actions they are familiar with. The increased risk propensity of managers could be inferred from the 
fact that MNEs seek out risky host environment compatible with the home country cognitive imprint 
(Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Therefore, satisfying home country venturing may convince managers that 
their risk-coping strategies will work in other markets, and become less avoidant to controllable 
institutional risks in subsequent decisions. 
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Hypothesis 1a: Managers’ experience of satisfaction with domestic sub-national operation 
increases their relative risk propensity regarding controllable institutional risk in FDI location 
decisions. 
Conversely, satisfying domestic experience with controllable risk hardly inform managers of 
their ability to tackle exogenous turmoil or conflicts. Instead, prospect theory predicts that individuals 
tend to be loss-averse when they have accumulated gains, and therefore unwilling to take further risk 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A common reference point in decision framing is the status quo, which 
is determined by the performance history of the firm and how decision makers classify it between 
success and failure (Greve, 1998). A negative situation where loss is likely and over which one has 
little control triggers responses (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). If the investment outcome is likely to cause 
loss of tangible resources and undermine a satisfactory status quo, managers would well refrain from 
making commitments (George et al., 2006). The tendency to avoid losses is further reinforced by 
attention allocation in the decision process. Managerial attention is a scarce resource, and distributed 
across a selected set of elements (Ocasio, 1997). Limited cognitive capacity forces managers to 
employ a simplifying strategy in developing mental representations of the problem to be handled 
(Gavetti et al., 2005). They tend to single out and pay heed only to the critical aspects of the situational 
context they encounter (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009). Insofar as managers can control some 
specific types of institutional risk – for instance mitigating contractual hazard through designed coping 
mechanisms and routines, the potential losses could be effectively reduced to a level that is acceptable 
to even risk-averse managers. In contrast, the consequence of non-controllable institutional risk for 
firms’ foreign operations is mostly determined independently of firms or managers’ capabilities, and 
thus poses a greater threat psychologically. Attention allocation may be driven by, and amplify, the 
focus on loss aversion.  
We theorize that managers who are satisfied with their performance in the home country may 
be preoccupied with defending current gains (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), and 
thereby concentrate attentional processing on potential threats to their “gain” positions when they 
engage in environmental scanning and evaluation. They will shun unfamiliar and risky foreign markets 
afflicted with political and civil unrest that could incur asset and personnel losses beyond managers’ 
 
 
11 
own control (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013). This is less the case when managers are empowered by 
the sense of potency to replicate their prior satisfying performance in tackling controllable risks. 
Research shows that prospect theory is not applicable when future outcomes are ambiguous and 
unmanageable, yet mostly efficacious when threats are perceived to be salient and certain (Holmes et 
al., 2011; Slattery & Ganster, 2002). Therefore, we contend that managers who are satisfied with their 
performance at home will be more averse to non-controllable institutional risk than those without 
positive home country experience. 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers’ experience of satisfaction with domestic sub-national operation 
reduce their relative risk propensity regarding non-controllable institutional risk in FDI location 
decisions. 
 
Potential slack  
In addition to performance feedback, behavioral theory posits that firms’ present conditions 
such as organizational slack affects risk propensity. Organizational slack is defined as a “cushion of 
actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures 
for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in strategy 
with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981: 30). We focus on potential slack, i.e. 
borrowing capacity, which has received less attention in the literature but bears a close relation to 
strategic investment including FDI.  
Behavioral theory suggests that slack influences risk-taking in two interrelated ways (Singh, 
1986; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). First, slack acts as a buffering mechanism to absorb 
environmental shocks, and allows firms to persist with risky strategies without the need for structural 
change (Cyert & March, 1963). Second, slack justifies risky strategies that are otherwise unacceptable, 
and thus increases the range of options open to managerial choice (Cheng & Kesner, 1997). Sufficient 
slack resources direct managers’ attention away from attaining the performance target toward the 
upside potential of greater variability in search of extra return (March & Shapira, 1992). IB 
researchers follow these views and argue that slack buffers political risk and contributes to the 
resource base for implementing new strategies, thereby enhancing firms’ ability to exploit foreign 
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market opportunities and skip intermediate steps in internationalization (Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & 
McCullough, 2007).  
Although the facilitating role of slack is well argued, empirical research – especially on 
potential slack – has provided inconclusive findings (Rhee & Cheng, 2002). Singh (1986) reports that 
excess uncommitted resources have no effect on firms’ orientation toward risk-taking, while Lin, 
Cheng, and Liu (2009) find that potential slack is positively associated with a firm’s international 
expansion. When an investment registers poor performance, firms with abundant potential resources 
can afford delaying the decision to divest and bet on the future recovery (Kuusela, Keil, & Maula, 
2017). This effect is particularly evident when loss is relatively large (Shimizu, 2007). As managers 
are most likely to prefer less risky alternatives in the face of large possible losses, potential slack plays 
a crucial role in facilitating risk-taking when the investment involves significant risks (March & 
Shapira, 1987). One of such risk in the FDI context emanates from host country’s political 
environment. Risks like societal unrest may cause loss of assets or disrupt firms’ operations (Miller, 
1992). Potential slack alleviates managers’ concern over the consequence of institutional risks since 
additional borrowing capacity insures that foreign market turbulence will not jeopardize the firm’s 
overall financial position and its core business (Lin et al., 2009).  
The slack-as-resource literature has focused much theoretical discussion on slack’s buffering 
role against external environmental shocks. Although no distinction has been made between 
controllable and non-controllable risks in the studies of slack, it is reasonable to contend that the slack-
as-resource argument applies in the face of non-controllable institutional risks. This is because 
managers are likely to resort to buffering mechanisms when they cannot exert any meaningful 
influence over the hazards ahead. The facilitating effect of potential slack thus aligns well with the 
“house money” thesis developed in a gambling context where odds are exogenously given (Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990). But, rarely is it argued or tested as to whether potential slack prompts managers to 
assume controllable risk as well. Following the second mechanism of slack, we argue that access to 
abundant capital encourages managers to experiment with riskier strategies and hope for greater 
return. This is likely when managers believe they can manipulate the regulatory environment to their 
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advantage (Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Thus, there is no a priori reason 
to suggest that slack cannot shield firms from controllable institutional risks. 
Hypothesis 2a: Potential slack increases managers’ relative risk propensity regarding 
controllable institutional risk in FDI location decisions. 
Hypothesis 2b: Potential slack increases managers’ relative risk propensity regarding non-
controllable institutional risk in FDI location decisions. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research setting and sample 
We test our hypotheses on managers of Chinese private firms. In China, the domestic market 
is fragmented by provincial protectionism and institutional disparities across subnational regions 
(Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Domestic venturing in other provinces provides important learning 
opportunities for Chinese firms to tackle institutional risks arising from the region-specific, 
discretionary enforcement of formal rules. While the single home country context makes managers’ 
sub-national experiential learning comparable, our hypotheses are generalizable to other national 
contexts, and most readily, to other countries with substantial sub-national heterogeneity like Brazil 
and India. Compared with SOEs, Chinese private firms share with MNEs from other countries similar 
characteristics of market orientation and advantage exploitation (Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012), 
which enhances the external validity of the study.  
Our sample consists of 60 top executives of Chinese private manufacturing firms that either 
have foreign subsidiaries, or have expressed a strong intention to engage in cross-border investment. 
Considering the lengthy and highly structured task we ask managers to complete, we employ 
purposive sampling that enables us to a) recruit top managers as respondents, and b) establish a 
balanced sample of international vs. non-international experience as well as various firm sizes. As 
different industry sectors are characterized by varying levels of tangible and intangible resource 
commitment with implications for risk exposure, we intentionally restrict the sample to manufacturers. 
All firms are headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai or Zhejiang province.   
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Discrete choice method 
To examine managers’ views on risk, we employ the discrete choice method that has been 
widely used in marketing, transport, health economics, and recently IB research (Buckley et al., 
2007b). Discrete choice method is theoretically grounded on random utility theory and the assumption 
of utility maximization (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). This assumption holds in our theorization 
since, despite being boundedly rational, managers make intendedly rational choice to maximize the 
chance of achieving a predetermined objective, irrespective of its substantive nature (Buckley & 
Casson, 2009; Chung & Alcacer, 2002). The utility that manager n obtains from choosing alternative j 
is given by: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑥𝑛𝑖 is a vector of observed location attributes for alternative 𝑖, and 𝛽 is a vector of 
weighting parameters (i.e. regression coefficients on location attributes) that reflects managers’ 
preference structure. 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑖 represents the systematic component of utility whilst 𝜀𝑛𝑗 describes an 
unknown, random component – reflective of preference heterogeneity and measurement error. Utility 
theory is based on the notion of compensatory behavior in that gains in one attribute can compensate 
for losses in another. Managers are assumed to compare, consciously or intuitively, the alternatives 
and make a choice that delivers the highest utility as per the trade-offs among the attribute levels. The 
quasi-experiment offers three advantages. First, the marginal utility parameters extracted from 
managers’ own behavior indicate their ex ante, general views on each location attribute. The risk 
coefficients are estimates of managers’ sensitivity to specific risk attributes. Second, a variety of 
aspects of international risk could be added in the experiment as observable attributes of the 
hypothetical location options. The analysis of managers’ marginal preference for each risk reveals the 
relative perceived importance of one another. Third, we can examine managers’ current sensitivity to a 
risk without reference to any specific host country, thereby eliminating the contamination of 
idiosyncratic risk perceptions (Weber & Milliman, 1997).  
We draw upon Buckley et al. (2007b) – who derive their design from an extensive review of 
the location literature – to develop the location attributes and levels. We further reduce the variable list 
to the attributes having the most significant and consistent effect as per their results. Definition and 
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dimensionality of the attributes are determined based on a review of academic literature and 
professional reports. We pre-tested the face validity of the attributes and the realism of the task 
through in-depth interviews with academics and ten Chinese state-owned and private MNE managers. 
Modifications are made to the attribute definitions, and new attributes are added to suit our research. 
Since the choice task is conducted face-to-face and presented in Chinese, we work with these 
academics to ensure that the Chinese and English versions match. Table 1 presents the definitions of 
the final ten location attributes and the associated levels. We follow Street and Burgess (2007) to 
utilize “D-optimal design”, a common fractional factorial design in choice experiments that reduces 
the number of choices that each manager has to make. It is a generalized design maximizing the D-
efficiency value – an indicator of the goodness of the design, which minimizes the variances and 
covariances of the coefficient estimates 𝛽 and enables more precise estimation of the utility function 
(Kuhfeld, Tobias, & Garratt, 1994). Each respondent works through the same 32 pairs of hypothetical, 
unlabeled investment locations, representing 32 choice scenarios. The location attributes used to 
describe all 64 location options are identical, but the attribute levels are varied as per the underlying 
D-optimal design. By manipulating the levels, we force managers to make trade-offs between risk and 
return as well as between one type of risk and another. We also specify that the investment being made 
would require 30% of the firm’s total cash available for investment for the next three years. 
Respondents have the option to choose location 1, location 2 or neither across 32 choice sets. Table 2 
presents a sample choice task. 
We use political instability – a function of high-level political game (Maitland & Sammartino, 
2015a) – to represent non-controllable institutional risk, and use legal protection – which mostly bears 
on opportunistic appropriation by, and contractual disputes with, transactional parties – to represent 
controllable institutional risk. A similar distinction has been made in the real options literature 
(Cuypers & Martin, 2009). We operationalize relative risk propensity as the negative coefficient ratio 
of risk over return on investment (ROI), i.e. the impact of risk relative to return. To do so, we code 
ROI as a continuous variable in estimation. For H1 and H2, we further collect information on a set of 
firm-level contextual variables. Following Zollo (2009), we employ a perceptual measure, and focus 
on domestic experience satisfaction which refers to managers’ evaluation (0=no sub-national 
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experience, 1=extremely dissatisfied, 9=extremely satisfied) of orchestrating operations in sub-
national areas other than the home province (mean=5.22, sd.=2.15, max=8, min=0). This measure also 
allows us to capture historical gains or losses relative to managers’ aspirations (Greve, 1998). As the 
discrete choice task specified the percent of cash reserve to be invested, we effectively controlled for 
available slack, i.e. excess liquidity, and thus devote attention to potential slack (Bourgeois & Singh, 
1983). For potential slack to influence strategic decision-making, it “must be visible to the manager 
and employable in the future” (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988: 602). We measure potential 
slack on a five-point scale (mean=2.8, sd.=0.81, max=5, min=1) by asking respondents’ perceived 
easiness of acquiring bank loan in the home country (Tan & Peng, 2003). This measure captures the 
theoretical essence of the commonly used equity-to-debt ratio.  
*** Table 1 *** 
*** Table 2 *** 
 
Estimation 
In line with previous studies (Buckley et al., 2007b), we first use conditional logit model as a 
starting point to examine managers’ location decisions in aggregate (McFadden, 1974). Each choice 
set, or commonly referred to as “group”, contains three observations and three responses (location 1, 
location 2 and neither). The dependent variable takes the value one if chosen and zero otherwise. The 
result (vector 𝛽) of the aggregate model denotes marginal contributions of each attribute level to 
managers’ systematic utility. However, conditional logit has been criticized for its strong assumption 
about individuals having the same preference structure. Systematic preference variability is conflated 
in the random component in equation 1. To test for preference heterogeneity, we follow prior research 
and estimate a mixed logit model where all coefficients are allowed to vary across individuals along 
independent normal distributions (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). We compare model fit between 
conditional and mixed logit models to assess heterogeneity, and examine whether risk coefficients 
vary systematically between managers. Our results, shown later, do confirm managerial heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, one restriction of mixed logit model is that it imposes prespecified distribution 
functions on random coefficients, the most common being normal distribution (Belderbos & Somers, 
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2015). We have no a priori theoretical reason to adopt a particular function form. Random coefficients 
also create significant difficulty in estimating relative risk propensity, i.e. the coefficient of risk over 
that of return. Therefore, we employ a latent class logit model – a more flexible semiparametric 
extension of conditional logit that approximates coefficient variation with a finite mixing distribution 
across individuals. That is, we assume that managers could be assigned to different classes due to their 
different responses to location attributes. The choice probability that manager n of class q chooses 
alternative i is expressed as: 
𝑃𝑛𝑖|𝑞 =
𝑒𝛽𝑞𝑥𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑞𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑗
  (2) 
Preference structure 𝛽𝑞 is shared within a given class of managers but differs between classes, 
capturing cross-group heterogeneity. Class membership of a manager is a function of contextual 
covariates, with 𝐻𝑛𝑞 denoting the probability of individual n belonging in class q. 
𝐻𝑛𝑞 =
𝑒𝜃𝑞𝑧𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝜃𝑐𝑧𝑛𝑄𝑐=1
  (3) 
where z is a vector of observable individual specific variables and θ the weighting vector. 
Manager's choice behavior depends on both location attributes 𝑥 as well as latent heterogeneity that 
varies with observable individual-specific characteristics 𝑧 (Greene & Hensher, 2003). Our study 
posits that domestic experience satisfaction and potential slack influence managers’ relative risk 
propensity and are the focal variables in 𝑧. Therefore, we compare this coefficient ratio across latent 
classes to examine how managers influenced by these contextual variables may be more or less 
avoidant to controllable and non-controllable risks than others. The relative risk approach avoids the 
problem of varying residual variations that prevent the direct comparison of coefficients of different 
logit equations (Hoetker, 2007). In a robustness check, we also run conditional and mixed logit models 
with interaction terms to account for the effect of covariates, and contrast them with our main 
specification on model fit.  
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RESULTS 
This section first provides results of the conditional logit model, followed by a comparison 
with mixed logit. We report whether indicators of model fit justify accounting for preference 
heterogeneity, and illustrate specific areas of difference among managers. The indication of group-
level heterogeneity motivates us to adopt the latent class model as the main specification. We start 
result reporting with control variables, i.e. return attributes, and then move on to the risk attributes. For 
the latent class model, this is followed by a between-class comparison of relative risk propensities – 
i.e. to what extent controllable and non-controllable risks matter to different classes of managers and 
how they differ between classes. We then relate contextual variables with between-class heterogeneity.  
Conditional and mixed logit model. Table 3 presents the coefficient of each attribute level 
and its significance for the conditional logit model (Column 1). A positive and significant coefficient 
denotes that managers on average prefer this level, since it adds on to their utilities. Column 1 shows 
that managers take operation costs into consideration as expected. We do not witness a monotonic 
effect as the lowest cost-of-operation is not appreciated. As expected, ROI and access to new 
resources and technologies are positive and statistically significant. The influences of market size and 
growth are less clear-cut. Yet it is without doubt that managers react positively to locations featuring 
large market and high growth. The results confirm the validity of discrete choice method as managers 
behave by and large the way economic theory of FDI suggests as regards the return variables. Cost and 
ROI remain the most important considerations for our sampled managers. For risk attributes, the 
results in Column 1 are mostly highly significant, except that managers do not consider powerful local 
stakeholder a hindrance to investment. As a rationalist might expect, managers prefer familiar 
environment (existing line of business), and are deterred by intense competition, political instability 
(non-controllable institutional risk) and the lack of legal protection (controllable institutional risk). 
The results suggest that managers on aggregate take a risk-averse stance when making FDI location 
decisions. 
We have contended that heterogeneous preferences exist among managers. Thus, we run a 
mixed logit model where all coefficients are allowed to vary between individual managers. The means 
of the random coefficients are presented in Table 3 Column 2, and the standard deviations in Column 
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3. We find that eight coefficients have statistically significant standard deviations, including ROI and 
two institutional risk factors. Likelihood ratio test confirms that mixed logit achieves better fit than 
conditional logit (χ²(16) = 76.4, p<0.001). The results provide clear empirical justification for 
accommodating systematic preference heterogeneity, which is unaccounted for by the conditional logit 
model. In order to capture relative risk propensity, we focus on latent class logit as the main 
specification below. 
*** Table 3 *** 
Latent class logit model. Following conventional procedure (Greene & Hensher, 2003), we 
determine the appropriate number of classes in the latent class model based on information criteria. 
Consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) penalize 
more heavily the increasing number of parameters than Akaike information criterion (AIC) to control 
for overfitting. Lower value denotes better fit. Table 4 suggests that a two-class baseline model 
registers the best model fit as per both BIC and CAIC. In addition, we calculate the average of the 
highest posterior probability of class membership across all individuals to measure how well the two-
class model performs in differentiating the underlying preference structures. The average is around 
0.98, showing that managers clearly fall in either one class or the other and lending strong support to 
the two-class structure. Information criteria in Table 4 also confirm that the two-class model fits our 
data better than mixed logit. This implies that heterogeneity indeed resides at the group level rather 
than the individual level.  
*** Table 4 *** 
We run the full latent class logit model where two contextual variables are included as 
covariates which give structure to the latent class determination and test hypotheses. We also include 
in the covariate analysis a constant term, and foreign experience as a control, measured by the number 
of years since a firm’s first foreign investment. The class-specific coefficient of each attribute level, 
relative risk propensities, and covariate analysis for the two-class model are reported in Table 5. We 
again start with return attributes. While managers from both classes uniformly value ROI and high 
growth rates, we notice a few important differences. For instance, Class 1 managers strongly avoid a 
20% decrease in production cost. Surprising as it may seem, it is not unseen among previous choice 
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modelling analyses as for some managers a big drop in cost signals potential problems in an area 
uncaptured by the attribute levels of the experiment, e.g. production quality, which are apparently 
considered undesirable (Anderson, Coltman, Devinney, & Keating, 2011). Conversely, Class 2 – the 
majority group – exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship between the lowest cost 
and investment decision, and indeed show a monotonic effect of cost. Moreover, Class 2 managers 
seek new resources from foreign markets whereas Class 1 managers do not. Other between-class 
differences include a significant yet divergent attitude toward small market size as well as negative 
and low market growth. 
*** Tables 5 and 6 *** 
The coefficients of risk attributes reveal which attribute levels matter to managers and how 
they differ between managers of different classes. Class 1 managers tend to eschew all risks featured 
in the experiment – they avoid powerful local stakeholders, intense industrial competition, unstable 
political environment (non-controllable institutional risk), and poorly developed legal institutions 
(controllable institutional risk). These managers also prefer to stay in the existing line of business 
when venturing abroad. Class 2 managers also shun controllable and uncontrollable risks; but both 
coefficients are smaller compared with Class 1. Moreover, Class 2 are not deterred by the presence of 
stakeholders like labor unions, and feel indifferent to industrial diversification in a foreign market. 
Both controllable risk (AME=-0.514, p<0.001) and non-controllable risk (AME=-0.551, p<0.001) are 
among the most important location factors by average marginal effects. For controllable risk (legal 
protection), a change from “strong protection” to “no protection” reduces, on average, the probability 
of investment by 51.4% points. For non-controllable risk (political instability), a change from “stable” 
to “unstable” leads to an average reduction in the probability of investment by 55.1% points. 
To determine how managers differ in risk taking, we calculate relative risk propensity by 
dividing the negative coefficient of risk by that of ROI from the same class (Louviere et al., 2000). 
The greater the score, the more investment return the managers are willing to sacrifice in order to 
avoid additional risks, and hence the more risk averse they are. Tests on relative risk propensities in 
Table 5 reveal that Class 1 managers are less concerned with controllable institutional risk (χ²(1)=4.89, 
p<0.05), but more avoidant to non-controllable risk (χ²(1)=6.65, p<0.01), as compared to Class 2. 
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To test H1 and H2, we focus on the role of covariates in distinguishing groups of managers. A 
positive and significant coefficient of a covariate attached to a particular class indicates that managers 
are more likely to fall in this class as the value of the covariate increases, and therefore display the 
preference structure associated with this class. Table 5 suggests that managers who are satisfied with 
their performance in the domestic market are more likely to belong in Class 1, which are relatively less 
deterred by the lack of legal protection (controllable institutional risk) yet have a stronger aversion to 
political instability (non-controllable institutional risk), compared to those less satisfied with domestic 
cross-regional operations. Therefore, H1a and H1b are supported. Conversely, firms’ potential slack is 
positively associated with managers’ membership in Class 2, which are less averse to political 
instability (non-controllable institutional risk) and more sensitive to the lack of legal protection 
(controllable institutional risk) than Class 1, thereby supporting H2b but rejecting H2a. Foreign 
experience is insignificant in assigning class membership (p<0.141). This is unsurprising as recent 
research suggests that the lack of prior international experience may not be a constraint for risk-taking 
in Chinese MNEs’ FDI location choices (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). 
We check whether our main specification performs better than alternative models. As opposed 
to the cross-group heterogeneity revealed in the latent class model, we specify that managerial 
heterogeneity resides at the individual level – by using interactions in the conditional and mixed logit 
models. In conditional logit, we create four product terms between two risk factors and two 
hypothesized covariates, domestic experience satisfaction and potential slack, respectively. In mixed 
logit, we allow all parameters to be random, and use these two covariates to account for observed 
heterogeneity in risk propensity. This is to test whether the two covariates influence the mean of the 
random institutional risk coefficients. We find that only the interaction between political instability 
and potential slack is significant and as predicted. Table 4 indicates that our main specification fits the 
data better than these two alternative models.  
 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study revisits extant theorizing on firms’ heterogeneous risk-taking in FDI, and offers an 
account of individual-level relative risk propensity as an alternative to the firm-level capabilities 
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explanation. Quasi-experimental analysis verifies the validity of the construct in the location choice 
context, and demonstrates its efficacy in delineating the mechanism through which firm experience 
and present conditions influence FDI risk-taking. In particular, we find that there is significant 
heterogeneity in managerial relative risk propensity, and that how contextual variables influence this 
heterogeneity depends on the nature of the risk. Satisfaction with home country venturing increases 
managers’ sensitivity to controllable risk, but attenuates their appetites for non-controllable risk. 
Conversely, potential slack reduces relative risk propensity regarding controllable risk and increases 
the tendency to take on non-controllable risk. The revealed heterogeneity in risk propensity helps open 
up the black box of firms’ FDI behavior, and paves the way for future research in numerous respects. 
First, our findings yield new insights into FDI location decisions. Instead of attributing 
organizational regularities to unobserved capabilities, we suggest that heterogeneity in FDI risk-taking 
may be the result of varying managerial risk propensity due to differential firm experience and present 
conditions. The conventional conceptualization of risk propensity leaves unaccounted the risk-return 
tradeoff in the decision process. Observed risk-taking may be driven by an unobserved ambition for 
growth, rather than a craving for risk. Our approach instead captures relative risk propensity, i.e. how 
much expected return one would trade for less risk. Accounting for the intervening role of managerial 
cognition in the decision process may reconcile the mixed findings of prior research, not least the 
debate on whether and why EMNEs are less constrained by international risk (Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
We argue that they are not necessarily more capable in dealing with risks, but the perceived control 
over some risks allow them to tap into opportunities that western MNEs may shy away from (cf. 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Another explanation is that capital market imperfections in the home 
country grant these firms abundant potential slack (Buckley et al., 2007a), which, according to our 
findings, reduces managers’ sensitivity to non-controllable political risk relative to investment return. 
Our results corroborate the slack-as-resource argument where slack is viewed as facilitating strategic 
behavior (Singh, 1986). This contrasts with Wiseman and Bromiley’s (1996) “hunger-driven” view 
where low potential slack triggers problemistic search and risk-taking. The explanation may lie in the 
difference between income stream uncertainty examined by Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) and our 
focus on ex ante managerial risk-taking. Moreover, we find that potential slack has a divergent effect 
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on taking controllable vs. non-controllable risks. Its facilitating role in the face of non-controllable risk 
corroborates the capital market imperfection explanation of Chinese firms’ unconventional attitude 
toward political risk (Buckley et al., 2007a). Yet, the fact that potential slack reduces managerial risk 
propensity regarding controllable risks departs from our expectation. One could argue that excess 
funds, or “house money”, increase Chinese managers’ capacity to experiment with more aggressive 
strategies that they otherwise cannot afford, but diminish their appetite for risks similar to those at 
home. Future research is encouraged to explore further the essence of home country advantages of 
EMNEs in risky foreign territories.  
Second, the theoretical distinction between controllable and non-controllable risks extends the 
institutions literature. IB literature tends to generalize arbitrarily the effect observed on one aspect to 
the “institution” as a whole. We find that the effect of institutional risk may vary depending on the 
specific aspect being considered. Some countries boast a well-developed democratic political system 
as a legacy of colonialism, but suffer from an ineffective legal system against organized crime or 
corruption (Henisz, 2000). Knowledge and cognitive resources about how to operate in corrupt 
countries can only induce managers to venture in corrupt foreign countries but not necessarily in 
politically unstable countries, although both fall in the category of “weak institutions”. One 
implication is that, despite the role of weak home institutions in preparing EMNEs for risky countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Holburn & Zelner, 2010), the alleged learning effect should not be taken for 
granted across all aspects of institutions. We find that managers with satisfying domestic experience 
are particularly averse to political instability, conforming to the loss-aversion thesis. Experiential 
learning regarding, for instance, tackling contractual disputes with local suppliers, seems to bear little 
relation to coping with operational disruption resulting from political turbulence in the host country. 
The simplistic classification of advanced vs. weak institutions based on gross aggregations may have 
masked the unique influences of different aspects of institutions.  
Lastly, changing risk propensity has implications for FDI theories. Extant theories are built on 
the static assumptions about managers’ dispositional risk preference (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). 
Economics-based FDI theory assumes that managers are risk-neutral (Buckley & Casson, 2009), 
whereas the Uppsala model postulates that managers are risk-averse and have an inherently low level 
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of maximum tolerable risk (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Empirical anomalies are often treated as 
special cases. One example is the variety of explanations for why Chinese MNEs are less deterred by 
host country risks despite the lack of international experience. While phenomena like this seem against 
the Uppsala model, our findings imply that they may be due to a) the unobserved tradeoff between risk 
and expected return, and b) the unaccounted variation in managerial risk propensity in relation to 
contextual influences (Buckley & Strange, 2011). Although we concur that the static assumption of 
risk preference is useful for the parsimony of theory building, this convention leaves little room for the 
dynamics of managerial behavioral tendencies. Our findings of changing risk propensity and of 
antecedents to such changes offer generalizable insights beyond the studies of EMNEs. We call for a 
refinement of the behavioral assumptions that shall maintain the predictive efficacy of the general 
theories. 
 
Limitations and future research agendas 
In our quasi-experiment, tradeoffs had to be made between the length of the experiment (as a 
function of the number of attributes and location pairs) and the number of managers that are willing to 
participate. Despite that, in general, utility-based choice predictions resulting from discrete choice 
methods are very accurate representations of reality (Louviere et al., 2000), the limited sample size 
calls for caution over the generalizability of the results. We compromised the sample size for more 
data per individual, leading to better description of the segmentation of the respondents. We believe 
that in so doing this study makes a unique contribution in using experimentation to reveal managerial 
heterogeneity in response to firm experience and context. 
However, our study cannot effectively differentiate managerial characteristics from firm-level 
antecedents. While risk propensity empirically incorporates the influence of both trait and context, we 
only account for how risk propensity varies in relation to firm experience and present conditions. It is 
likely that managers’ dispositional orientations and individual characteristics such as cognitive style 
and entrepreneurial attitude also explain some variance (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). This may be 
subsumed in our estimates. While we can argue that organizational routines and experience may 
overshadow personal characteristics in firms’ strategic decision making, it is not always the case. To 
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include individual effects would require sampling on observable characteristics and traits, and would 
ideally need a sample of multiple top decision makers within each organization. We encourage future 
research to decompose the heterogeneity arising from both individual and firm-level antecedents to 
risk propensity.  
Our hypotheses explore the role of home country experience in shaping managers’ relative 
risk propensity. It is implicit that this experience is confined to dealing with controllable risk. The 
sample choice also reflects so; venturing in China rarely confronts non-controllable risks such as 
political turmoil, although some degree of policy disruption has been reportedly occurring. However, 
our conceptual framework needs not impose this restriction. The sample choice constrained our ability 
to consider the conceptual model in full; we cannot examine whether home experience with non-
controllable risk affects managers’ relative risk propensity regarding controllable vs. non-controllable 
risk in the same way as hypothesized here. We suggest future empirical research to distinguish 
effectively, and contrast, the effects of experience with these two types of risk.  
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Table 1. Investment Attributes and Levels 
Investment attributes Levels 
The cost of operations – Choosing a specific 
location can lead to higher or lower costs of 
operation across the value chain 
Decrease 20%, Decrease 10%, Increase 10%, 
Increase 20%  
Return on investment (ROI) – Describes the rate of 
return expected from the investment 
Significantly less than home market, Same as 
home market, Significantly greater than home 
market 
Access to new resources, assets and technologies – 
Choosing a specific location can lead to greater 
competences being developed in the firm, through 
access to physical resources, organizational assets, or 
new technologies 
No new access, Access 
 
Potential market size Large relative to home market, Same as home 
market, Small relative to home market 
Growth – The rate of sales increase in the market Decline, No growth, Low growth, Strong 
growth 
Political Instability (Non-controllable institutional 
risk) – Denotes the likelihood of political and civil 
unrest, and the extent of policy disruption due to 
either political transition or lack of institutional 
constraints on the policy making authority. 
Unstable, Stable 
Local stakeholders – Indicates the influence of local 
interest groups, such as community, producers, labor 
union, NGOs and the like.  
Powerful, Non-existent 
Line of business – Denotes whether the new 
investment is in an existing, related or new line of 
business  
Same line of business, Related line of 
business, Completely new line of business 
Local competition – Indicates the level of 
competition within the local industry the firm is to 
enter. 
Weak, Intense 
Legal protection (Controllable institutional risk) – 
Denotes whether legal structures are effective for the 
protection of both physical and intellectual assets, 
the settlement of investment disputes, and the control 
of corruption.  
No protection, Strong/adequate protection 
Note: We use effect coding for all these categorical variables (attribute levels). One level from each 
attribute, taken as the reference group, is omitted in the regression. For any given location alternatives, 
membership in a focal attribute level is coded 1, and non-membership 0. Membership in the omitted 
reference group assigns a -1 to each of the estimated levels from the same attribute. We retrieve the 
coefficients and standard errors for the reference levels using alternative coding – i.e. changing the 
reference group in a new regression.  
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Table 2. A Sample Choice Task 
Instructions: Your organization is considering direct investment in this foreign location and the 
investment being made takes up 30% of the total cash available for investment for the next three 
years. Please note each pair of options is independent of one another and compare only between 
two options in one pair.   
 Option A Option B 
Cost of operations Decrease 10% Increase 20% 
Return on investment Same as home market Significantly less than home 
market 
Access to new resources, 
assets and technologies 
Access No new access 
Potential market size Large relative to home market Same as home market 
Growth Strong growth Low growth 
Political Instability Stable Unstable 
Local stakeholders Powerful Powerful 
Local competition Weak Intense 
Line of business Related line of business Completely new line of 
business 
Legal protection Strong/adequate protection No protection 
If the investment option 
described above were 
available to your 
organization, which would 
you undertake instead of or in 
addition to other currently 
available investments (Tick 
ONE box only)? 
□ A □ B 
□ Neither 
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Table 3. Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit Models 
 Conditional 
Logita 
(1) 
Mixed 
Logitb 
(2) 
Mean 
coefficients 
Mixed 
Logitb 
(3) 
Std Dev 
coefficients 
Return attributes    
The cost of operations    
Cost decline by 20%  0.126 0.127 0.528*** 
Cost decline by 10% 0.453*** 0.523*** 0.283** 
Cost increase by 10% -0.160* -0.181* 0.239 
Cost increase by 20% -0.419*** -0.469*** 0.506*** 
Return on investment 0.496*** 0.545*** 0.249*** 
Access to new resources 0.082* 0.098* 0.140* 
Potential market size    
Smaller than home country -0.013 -0.022 0.076 
Same as home country -0.125* -0.150** 0.014 
Larger than home country 0.138** 0.172** 0.027 
Growth    
Declining -0.107 -0.111 0.138 
No growth -0.113 -0.112 0.125 
Low growth -0.142* -0.167* 0.019 
High growth 0.362*** 0.390*** 0.224 
Risk attributes    
Powerful local stakeholder -0.015 -0.011 0.058 
Intense local competition -0.236*** -0.261*** 0.145** 
Line of business    
Existing 0.165** 0.191*** 0.042 
Related -0.133* -0.159* 0.051 
Completely new -0.032 -0.032 0.106 
Political instability (uncontrollable risk) -0.788*** -0.930*** 0.456*** 
Legal protection (controllable risk) -0.545*** -0.617*** 0.204** 
Number of respondents              60          60  
Number of total choice sets            1,920        1,920  
Number of observations            5,760        5,760  
Sig. codes:  <0.001 ‘***’, <0.01 ‘**’, <0.05 ‘*’  
a Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
b Random coefficients are assumed to be independently normally distributed.  
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Table 4. Model Fit and Information Criteria for the Competing Models 
 Conditional 
logit 
Mixed logit Latent class logit Latent class 
full model 
Conditional 
logit with 
interactions 
Mixed logit 
with 
interactions 2-class 3-class 4-class 
Log likelihood -1738.9  -1700.7 -1678.5 -1653.6 -1632.6 -1664.9 -1727.5 -1696.1 
AIC 3511.7 3465.4 3423.0 3407.1 3399.1 3401.9 3495.0 3464.2 
BIC 3545.3 3532.4 3492.1 3511.8 3539.4 3477.3 3536.9 3539.6 
CAIC 3561.3 3564.4 3525.1 3561.8 3606.4 3513.3 3556.9 3575.6 
N. param. 16 32 33 50 67 36 20 36 
Note: Bold item indicates best model fit (i.e. minimum score among comparable models). 
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Table 5. Latent Class Model with Covariates 
 Class 1 Class 2 
Return attributes   
The cost of operations   
Cost decline by 20%  -0.927*** 0.588*** 
Cost decline by 10% 0.936*** 0.242** 
Cost increase by 10% 0.068 -0.271** 
Cost increase by 20% -0.077 -0.559*** 
Return on investment 0.790*** 0.435*** 
Access to new resources 0.084 0.156** 
Potential market size   
Smaller than home country 0.251* -0.141* 
Same as home country -0.473*** -0.054 
Larger than home country 0.222* 0.195** 
Growth   
Declining 0.365* -0.304** 
No growth -0.280* -0.022 
Low growth -0.580*** -0.021 
High growth 0.495*** 0.347*** 
Risk attributes   
Powerful local stakeholder -0.195* 0.042 
Intense local competition -0.329*** -0.235*** 
Line of business   
Existing 0.552*** 0.047 
Related -0.696*** 0.037 
Completely new 0.146 -0.084 
Political instability (uncontrollable risk) -1.476*** -0.533*** 
Legal protection (controllable risk) -0.786*** -0.515*** 
Relative risk propensity   
Political instability (non-controllable 
risk) 
1.868 1.225 
Legal protection (controllable risk) 0.995 1.184 
Covariates of latent class determination   
Domestic experience 0.598*** Fixed 
Potential slack -2.101*** Fixed 
Foreign experience -0.265 Fixed 
Constant 2.673 Fixed 
Class size 0.414 0.586 
LRT χ2 888.89*** 
R2McFadden 0.21 
Sig. codes:  <0.001 ‘***’, <0.01 ‘**’, <0.05 ‘*’  
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Note: Classes refer to groups of managers. Class 2 is taken as the reference group in covariate analysis 
for identification.  
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Figure 1 Risk propensity-location choice model 
 
 
